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Abstract
Part I of this Note examines the case law that addresses the issue of U.S. bank home office
liability. Part II analyzes U.S. monetary policy provisions that affect deposits held in foreign
branches of U.S. banks and the conditions under which a U.S. bank may become a guarantor. Part
III argues that the case law holding the U.S. bank home office liable implies a guaranty term into
the deposit account contract and frustrates efforts to regulate U.S. monetary policy. This Note
concludes that unless appropriate arragements are made between the foreign depositor and the
U.S. bank home office, the home office should not be liable for the return of deposits held in its
foreign branches.
HOLDING U.S. BANK HOME OFFICES LIABLE FOR
DEPOSITS IN THEIR FOREIGN BRANCHES
INTRODUCTION
It is currently the practice of U.S. courts to hold the home
office of a U.S. bank liable for the return of the deposits in its
foreign branch office if the foreign branch assets are confis-
cated or disposition of its assets are restricted. This practice,
most recently followed by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York in Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v.
Citibank, N.A.,' conflicts with the goal of U.S. monetary policy
as understood by U.S. monetary policymakers2 by making the
home office the guarantor of deposits in the foreign branch.
Part I of this Note examines the case law that addresses
the issue of U.S. bank home office liability. Part II analyzes
U.S. monetary policy provisions that affect deposits held in for-
eign branches of U.S. banks and the conditions under which a
U.S. bank may become a guarantor. Part III argues that the
case law holding the U.S. bank home office liable implies a
guaranty term into the deposit account contract and frustrates
efforts to regulate U.S. monetary policy. This Note concludes
that unless appropriate arrangements are made between the
foreign depositor and the U.S. bank home office, the home of-
fice should not be liable for the return of deposits held in its
foreign branches.
I. TREATMENT OF FOREIGN DEPOSITS BY U.S. COURTS
A. Nature of the Claim
The relationship between a bank and a depositor is that of
debtor and creditor.' The depositor, in effect, lends money to
I. 660 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), remanded, No. 87-7685 (2d Cir. Mar. 25,
1988) (order directing limited remand), previous judgment reaffirmed, No. 84 Civ. 996
(WK), slip op., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3604 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1988) (supplemental
findings of fact and conclusions of law).
. 2. For the purpose of this Note, the phrase "U.S. monetary policymakers"
means the Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System, the United States
)epartment of the Treasury, and Congress.
3. Sokololfv. National City Bank of N.Y., 130 Misc. 66, 73, 224 N.Y.S. 102, 113-
14 (Sup. Ct. 1927). aff'd without opinion, 223 A.D. 754, 227 N.Y.S. 907, afftd, 250 N.Y.
69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928). Sokoloffis a complicated case that produced six opinions
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the bank in return for the bank's promise to return the deposit
and pay for the use of the deposit, usually in the form of inter-
est. The depositor does not own a right to the exact dollars he
deposited; instead, he has a right to demand payment from the
bank for the amount deposited.4 When the deposit is not re-
turned upon the depositor's demand, the bank has breached
the deposit contract 5 and the depositor may then sue for the
return of money that the bank owes the depositor.
In the typical case leading to U.S. bank home office liabil-
ity, a citizen of a host country ("foreign depositor") opens a
deposit account at a foreign branch of a U.S. bank.6 Political
turmoil leads to the overthrow of the host government and the
installation of a new government. 7  The new government
places restrictions on the actions of the foreign branch' and
eventually confiscates the foreign branch's assets and assumes
its liabilities. ' The foreign depositor then approaches the U.S.
from the New York court system from 1923 through 1928. The first group of cases
addressed Sokoloff's motion to strike National City Bank's defenses of impossibility
and frustration. See Sokoloffv. National City Bank of N.Y., 120 Misc. 252, 199 N.Y.S.
355 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (denying the motion), rev'd, 208 A.D. 627, 204 N.Y.S. 69, aft'd,
239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917, reh'g denied, 239 N.Y. 171, 145 N.E. 921 (1924). Judge
Cardozo's opinion established the practice that the action should be pursued on the
theory of breach of contract and not, as Sokoloff had originally claimed, on a theory
of rescission. See Sokoloff, 239 N.Y. at 171, 145 N.E. at 921. The second group of
cases, which addressed National City Bank's defenses of payment and improper de-
mand, were dismissed as insufficient. See Sokoloff v. National City Bank of N.Y., 130
Misc. 66, 224 N.Y.S. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1927), aff'd without opinion, 223 A.D. 754, 227
N.Y.S. 907, off'd, 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928). The report of Referee Alfred
Page, 130 Misc. 66, 224 N.Y.S. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1927), was relied upon by the Second
Circuit for the proposition that ultimate liability lies with the home office. See Vi-
shipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 660 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 976 (1982).
4. See Scammon v. Kimball, 96 U.S. 362 (1876).
5. Sokoloff, 250 N.Y. at 81, 164 N.E. at 749.
6. See, e.g., Garcia, 735 F.2d at 646-47; Vishipco Line, 660 F.2d at 857; Perez v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 61 N.Y.2d 460, 465-66, 463 N.E.2d 5, 6, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689,
690, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984); Sokoloff, 130 Misc. at 68, 224 N.Y.S. at 108-10.
7. See, e.g., Garcia, 735 F.2d at 647; Vishipco Line, 660 F.2d at 857; Pere:, 61 N.Y.2d
at 466, 463 N.E.2d at 6, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 690-91; Soholoff, 130 Misc. at 70-72, 224
N.Y.S. at I 11-13.
8. See, e.g-., Garcia, 735 F.2d at 647; f'ishipco Line, 660 F.2d at 857; Pere-, 61 N.Y.2d
at 466, 463 N.E.2d at 6-7, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 690-91; Sokoollf, 130 Misc. at 71-72. 224
N.Y.S. at 112-13.
9. See, e.g., Garcia, 735 F.2d a( 647: Vishipco Line, 660 F.2d at 857; lerez, 61 N.Y.2d
at 466, 463 N.E.2d at 6-7, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 690-91; Sokolof. 130 Misc. at 71-72, 224
N.Y.S. at 112-13.
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bank home office and demands the return of his deposit."1
The first U.S. case to address the question whether the foreign
depositor could recover his deposit from a U.S. bank home of-
fice was Sokoloff v. National City Bank of New York."
B. Sokoloff: What To Do with a Deposit Caught in a Revolution
Sokoloff arranged with the head office of National City
Bank of New York ("National City Bank") to open a Russian
ruble deposit account in his name at National City Bank's
branch in Petrograd.' 2 After the fall of the Kerensky govern-
ment in November 1917, the new Soviet government issued
decrees merging all banks into the State Bank.' 3 Later, it na-
tionalized all private banks, resulting in the confiscation of the
assets of the Petrograd branch. 4 Subsequently, when Sokoloff
approached National City Bank in New York to withdraw his
deposit, National City Bank refused payment on the grounds
that the deposit was held by the Soviet government.1 5
In a subsequent suit for breach of contract, National City
Bank claimed that the actions of the Soviet Government re-
lieved the bank of its obligations to Sokoloff. The referee, in
his report to the Supreme Court in New York, noted that the
foreign branch was a "separate business entity" 1 6 and, as such,
the depositor could not demand payment at another branch
office. 17 But this fact did not alter the relationship between the
foreign branch and the home office, stated the referee. The
foreign branch was an instrument through which the home of-
fice "carries on its business."'" The referee reasoned that the
branch may normally hold assets and liabilities in its own
name, but its conduct and operating policies emanate from the
home office." ' Thus, "[u]ltimate liability for a debt of a branch
10. See. e.g., Garcia, 735 F.2d at 647-48; Vishipco Line, 660 F.2d at 857; Perez, 61
N.Y.2d at 466-67, 463 N.E.2d at 7, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
11. 130 Misc. 66, 224 N.Y.S. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1927), aff'd without opinion, 223 A.D.
754, 227 N.Y.S. 907, aff'd, 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928).
12. Sokoloff, 130 Misc. at 68-69, 224 N.Y.S. at 109-10.
13. Id. at 71, 224 N.Y.S. at 111-12.
14. Id. at 72, 224 N.Y.S. at 112-13.
15. Id. at 74, 224 N.Y.S. at 115.
16. Id. at 73, 224 N.Y.S. at 114.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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would rest upon the parent bank." ' Judgment was entered
for Sokoloff based on this report.2
C. The Rules of Disengagement
U.S. bank home office liability was reaffirmed and ex-
panded by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank. "' On April 24, 1975, near
the end of the Vietnam War, Chase officials in New York or-
dered its Saigon office to shut down.21 The Saigon office
closed its books, locked the vault and front door, and handed
over the keys and records to the French Embassy.2 4 They left
instructions that the French officials were to hand these items
over when the new government asked for them.2" The Chase
officials in Saigon then left Vietnam ,2 and on April 30, 1975,
Saigon fell. 7
The new government issued a communiqu6 on May 1,
1975, that professed, inter alia, to confiscate all assets of banks
and corporations in Vietnam.2 ' The French Embassy subse-
quently handed over the Saigon branch's records to the new
2')government.
Chase claimed that the corporate plaintiff, Vishipco Line,
should be denied recovery because the new government had
confiscated the corporations' 30 tangible and intangible assets,
20. Id.
21. See Sokoloff, 250 N.Y. at 70, 164 N.E. at 745-46.
22. 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
23. Id. at 857.
24. Id. The opinion in Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526 (E.). Mich.
1985), noted the reaction of the South Vietnamese government:
"ITlIhe Chase Manhattan Bank, the First National City Bank, and the Bank
of' America had closed temporarily without asking permission from our gov-
ernment. The Finance Ministry and the National Bank will apply sanc-
tions against these banks according to law.'" Clearly, the government of
South Vietnam did not close the banks]. And. of course, the revolutionary
forces had not yet gained control and thus did not close Citibank. Citibank
closed itself.
Id. at 1533-34.
25. IVishipco Line, 660 F.2d at 857.
26. 1(.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. I.
30. Tran )inh Truong represented ten corporate plaintifls. including \ishipco
L.ine. in this action. 660 F.2d at 857.
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the latter being the deposits held in the Saigon office.,' The
obligation to pay the individual plaintiff, Chase claimed, was
assumed by the new government, thus relieving the Saigon of-
fice of liability.3 2
The Second Circuit found that the key to Chase's liability
was that the Saigon office closed prior to the fall of the South
Vietnamese Government. When the Saigon office shut its
doors and fled, the debt to the plaintiffs had the effect of
"spring[ing] back" to the home office. 3 The May 1, 1975,
communiqu6 did not affect the Saigon office's obligations be-
cause as of that date there were no longer any assets or liabili-
ties of the Saigon office in Vietnam for the new government to
seize.
The Second Circuit also noted that by operating in Saigon
through a branch rather than a subsidiary, Chase "accepted
the risk that it would be held liable elsewhere for obligations
incurred by its branch. ' 34 The court contended that such an
operation "reassure[s] foreign depositors that their deposits
will be safer with them than they would be in a locally incorpo-
rated bank."' 35  The court then cited Sokoloff, noting that
"[uiltimate liability for a debt of a branch would rest upon the parent
bank."3 6
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 862-63 (quoting Heininger, Liability of US. Banks for Deposits Placed ini
Their Foreign Branches, 11 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 903, 975 (1979)).
34. Vishipco Line, 660 F.2d at 863.
35. Id.
36. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Sokoloffv. National City Bank, 130 Misc. at
73, 224 N.Y.S. at 114). The Second Circuit, however, incorrectly attributes this
quote to "Harrison Tweed, of the Milbank Tweed firm." Id. Chase Manhattan was
represented in this suit by Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. The quote was in fact
written by Referee Alfred Page. See 130 Misc. 66, 224 N.Y.S. 102. Referee Tweed is
noted for calling for a reassessment of Sokoloff in Dougherty v. National City Bank of
New York, 157 Misc. 849, 285 N.Y.S. 491 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
Dougherty involved four claims arising out of the closing of the Petrograd and
Moscow branch of National City Bank by the Soviet government in 1918. Id. at 850,
285 N.Y.S. at 494. Three of the claims involved deposits made at the foreign branch
office. Id. at 851, 285 N.Y.S. at 494-95. The fourth claim involved a deposit arrange-
ment made with the home office. Id. Referee Tweed noted that National City Bank
was excused from performance as to the three direct depositors, since the deposit
was payable only in the Soviet Union. Id. at 863-64, 285 N.Y.S. at 506-08. The
merger and confiscation decrees relieved the home office of any obligations its
branch offices may have had to the three depositors. Id. at 864, 285 N.Y.S. at 508.
National City Bank was not excused from performance to the indirect depositor,
1988]
626 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 11:621
The Second Circuit then expanded on Sokoloff by estab-
lishing what could be labeled "rules of disengagement" for
foreign branch offices. First, if conditions exist that require the
foreign branch to "cease operations, 37 the branch should:
(i) inform the depositors of the date the branch will close;"8
(ii) allow enough time for the depositors to withdraw their de-
posits;39 and (iii) if time is not available, inform the depositors
of an alternative place of payment.4" The court added that in
the "rare event" such steps were impossible, "fairness dic-
tates" that the home office is "liable for those deposits which it
was unable to return abroad."'"
Sokoloff and Vishipco hold that when the assets of the for-
eign branch are confiscated, the U.S. bank home office is liable
for the return of the foreign branch's deposits.42 Vishipco took
the next step and established rules of disengagement for for-
eign branches faced with political unrest. But what obligation,
if any, does the U.S. bank home office have when the foreign
branch's assets are merely frozen because of economic unrest?
This issue was addressed by the District Court for the South-
ern District of New York in Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank,
however, since under Sokoloff the deposit was governed by New York law. Id. at 864,
285 N.Y.S. at 507-08. Performance was limited but not excused. Referee Tweed,
however, urged the New York Court of Appeals to reassess this view to determine
whether the "mere fact" that the deposit arrangement was made in New York was
sufficient grounds for not giving effect to the Soviet decrees. Id.
37. Vishipco Line, 660 F.2d at 864.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See also Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984) (home
office held liable where Cuban branch officers stated that the CD purchased by the
plaintiff was guaranteed by the home office and could be presented for payment at
any branch of the bank); Trinh v. Citibank, 623 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(home office held liable, based on Vishipco, for deposit account opened at Saigon
branch of Citibank for the benefit of a child, and payment was later demanded when
father was released from re-education camp); Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 61
N.Y.2d 460, 463 N.E.2d 5, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984) (home
office was ultimately liable, but was under no obligation to pay on the deposit a sec-
ond time after paying the deposit to Cuban authorities). For a discussion of the Gar-
cia and Perez holdings, see Note, Debt Si/us and the Act of State Doctrine: .4 Proposal fr a
Afore Flexible Standard, 49 ALBANY L. REV. 647 (1985). For a critical discussion of i-
shipco Line, see Vishipco Line v. The Chase Manhattan Bank" Bank Liabilit'br Foreign
Branch Seizures, 2 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 393 (1983). See generally Heininger, Liabili of
U.S. Banks for Deposits Placed in Their Foreign Branches, I I LAW & Poi.'C INT'l. Bus. 903
(1979).
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3.A .
D. Wells Fargo: What to Do with a Deposit Caught
in a Debt Restructuring
On October 17, 1983, the Philippine Government, in fur-
therance of an external debt restructuring plan, issued a de-
cree that forbade repayment of principal to foreign banks with-
out prior approval by the Philippine central bank.44 The Ci-
tibank office in Manila informed Wells Fargo Asia Limited
("WFAL"), the Singapore branch of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
that it was unable to deliver payment on WFAL's certificates of
deposit because of the decree. 45 The Citibank office in Manila
eventually obtained Philippine approval to make a partial pay-
ment by using its non-Philippine assets, that is, money gener-
ated by loans and investments made by the Manila branch
outside of the Philippines.46
WFAL claimed that the Manila branch should also use as-
sets located at the home office to satisfy the debt owed to
WFAL.47 WFAL's reasons were that: (i) Philippine law states
that debt obligations of a branch are the obligations of the
bank as a whole;48 and (ii) Citibank otherwise assumed the risk
that the host government would place payment restrictions on
the foreign branch.4 9
Citibank claimed that it was not required to use home of-
fice assets since: (i) the act of state doctrine precluded the
court from ruling on the validity of the actions of the Philip-
43. 660 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), remanded, No. 87-7685 (2d Cir. Mar. 25,
1988) (order directing limited remand), previous judgment reaffirmed, No. 84 Civ. 996
(WK), slip op., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3604 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1988) (supplemental
findings of fact and conclusions of law).
44. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 612 F. Supp. 351, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). The facts relied upon in the district court's opinion in 660 F. Supp. 946 are
contained in this opinion denying Wells Fargo Asia Limited's motion for summary
judgment. See Jllells Fargo, 612 F. Supp. at 352-55.
45. 612 F. Supp. at 355.
46. Id.
47. Wlells Fargo, 660 F. Supp. at 947.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 950. The Act of State doctrine is a principle ofjudicial restraint that
prevents U.S. courts from passing on the validity of a sovereign's actions with respect
to property within its jurisdiction. See generallv Heininger, supra note 42, at 950-87;
Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Resolving Debt Situs Confusion, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 594
(1986).
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pine government; 5° (ii) there existed an understanding in the
banking community that a foreign depositor assumed the risk
that a host government would restrict the withdrawal of funds
from a foreign branch; 5' and (iii) Treasury Regulation D 12 evi-
denced an understanding in the banking community that the
repayment of the deposit was subject to the laws of the host
country53 because the deposit was payable only through the
50. 660 F. Supp. at 947.
51. Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 12 C.F.R. §§ 204.1-124
(1988). The provisions effecting deposits in foreign branch offices are as follows:
204.1 Authority, Purpose and Scope.
(b) Purpose. This part relates to reserves that depository institutions are
required to maintain for the purpose of facilitating the implementation of
monetary policy by the Federal Reserve System.
(c) Scope. (1) The following depository institutions are required to
maintain reserves in accordance with this part: ....
(5) The provisions of this part do not apply to any deposit that is paya-
ble only at an office located outside the United States.
204.2 Definitions .....
(t) "Any deposit that is payable only at an office located outside the
United States" means (1) a deposit of a United States resident that is in a
denomination of $100,000 or more, and as to which the depositor is enti-
tled, under the agreement with the institution, to demand payment only
outside the United States or (2) a deposit of a person who is not a United
States resident as to which the depositor is entitled, under the agreement
with the institution, to demand payment only outside the United States.
12 C.F.R. §§ 204.1-.2 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
52. Wells Fargo, 660 F. Supp. at 947.
53. WFAL instructed Wells Fargo International ("WFI"), the New York branch
of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., to transfer funds from its account with WFI to Ci-
tibank/Manila's account at Citibank, N.A., in New York. W1'ells Fargo, 612 F. Supp. at
354. Citibank/Manila, in turn, agreed to reverse the process, including the interes
payment, on the maturity date. Id. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, ill all
amicus curiae brief filed in this case, noted that this fact did not have any bearing on
whether the deposit was payable outside of the United States for the purpose of Reg-
ulation D reserve requirements:
The location where the depositor has legal right to demand payment is
a distinct concept from the location where the deposit is settled. The fact
that settlement of United States dollar deposit liabilities takes place in the
United States between United States domiciliaries is not determinative of
where the deposit is legally payable. Virtually all United States large-dollar
transactions between parties located outside the United States must be set-
tled in the United States. The Clearing House Interbank Payments System,
or CHIPS, operated by the New York Clearing House Association for sonic
140 banks, handles at least $400 billion in transfers each day, and it is as-
sumed that perhaps 90 percent of these payments are in settlement of off-
shore transactions.
Memorandum of Law of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as Amicus Curiae at
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foreign branch.54 Citibank argued that the decree thus excused
the Manila office from further performance under its contract
with WFAL until it received approval from the Philippine cen-
tral bank.
The district court, citing an affidavit presented by WFAL,
concluded that under Philippine law "an obligation incurred
by a branch is an obligation of the bank as a whole ' 55 and that
the decree did not prevent Citibank from using its "worldwide
assets" for satisfaction of WFAL's claim.56
The district court did not resolve the issue of who as-
sumed the risk of non-payment because the evidence
presented was not persuasive of either party's argument. 57 Nor
did it rule upon the impact of Treasury Regulation D, which it
viewed as a moot question given the fact that its holding was
based on Philippine law.5
II. TREATMENT OF FOREIGN DEPOSITS BY U.S.
MONE TAR Y POLIC YMA KER S
The treatment accorded a foreign deposit by U.S. courts is
different from the treatment it is accorded by U.S. monetary
policymakers. While U.S. courts have held that the home of-
fice is always liable for the payment of the foreign deposit, U.S.
monetary policymakers, on the other hand, consider the home
office liable only when the foreign deposit is payable in the
United States.59 The view held by U.S. monetary policymakers
is based on the function of the reserve requirement, certain
exemptions from the reserve requirement, and the conditions
under which a bank is allowed to issue a guaranty.
A. Federal Reserve Regulations
Section 19 of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (the "Act")
12-13, Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 660 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(No. 84 Civ. 996 (WK)), remanded, No. 87-7685 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 1988) (order di-
recting limited remand), previous judgment reaffirmed, No. 84 Civ. 996 (WK), slip op.,
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3604 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1988) (supplemental findings of fict
and conclusions of law) [hereinafter N.Y. Fed. Brief in WFAL].
54. MIellf Fargo, 660 F. Supp. at 949.
55. Id. at 950.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See itfra notes 60-81 and accompanying text.
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requires, member banks to set aside vault cash to provide for
unseasonable withdrawals by depositors."" Although this re-
quirement was originally intended to serve as a liquidity func-
tion to the whole banking system,6 ' the reserve requirement
today, by law, is used solely for the purpose of implementing
monetary policy. 2
The Federal Reserve has three major tools to regulate the
U.S. money supply and thereby to regulate economic growth
in the United States: the reserve requirement, the discount
rate on loans made to financial institutions,63 and purchases or
sales on the open market by the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee of the Federal Reserve System ("FOMC"). 64 An increase in
the reserve requirement, or an increase in the discount rate, or
sales by the FOMC, causes a contraction in the pool of money
available to the member banks for purposes of making loans or
investments.65 On the other hand, a decrease in the reserve
requirement, or in the discount rate, or purchases by the
FOMC, has the opposite effect. 66 These tools allow the Fed-
eral Reserve to pursue its primary function: to ensure a stable
60. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 19, 38 Stat. 251, 270-71 (1913) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
61. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has noted that in 1918 "reserve
requirements on domestic deposits were intended primarily to protect domestic de-
posits by promoting liquidity of member banks. The [12 regional] Reserve Banks
made the reserves available to supply the member banks demand for currency, espe-
cially when withdrawals by domestic depositors were abnormally high." N.Y. Fed.
Brief in. WFAL, supra note 53, at 6-7; see also W. MELTON, INSIDE THE FED: MAKING
MONETARY POLICY 16-17 n.l (1985).
62. Section 19 of the Federal Reserve Act states in part: "Each depository insti-
tution shall maintain reserves against its transaction accounts as the Board [of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System] may prescribe by regulation solely for the pur-
pose of implementing monetary policy .... " 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(2)(A) (1982).
63. The Discount Rate is the interest rate the Federal Reserve charges on short-
term loans to financial institutions. W. MELTON, supra note 61, at 17 n.2.
64. The Supreme Court has noted:
The Federal Open Market Committee . . . by statute has exclusive control
over the open market operations of the entire Federal Reserve System. The
FOMC is charged with conducting open market operations "with a view to
accommodating commerce and business and with regard to their bearing
upon the general credit situation of the country."
Federal Open Market Comm. v. Merrill, 343 U.S. 340, 344 (1979) (citation and foot-
note omitted); se also N.Y. Fed. Brief in WFAL, supra note 53, at 4-5; W. MELTON,
supra note 61, at 202-15.
65. See N.Y. Fed. Brief in WFAL, supra note 53, at 4-5; W. MEILTON, supra note 61,
at 114.
66. Id.
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money supply to promote orderly growth and to curb infla-
tion.67
B. Exemption for Deposits in Foreign Branches
A 1918 opinion of the Counsel to the Federal Reserve
Chairman"8 noted that although the Federal Reserve was au-
thorized to require foreign branch offices of U.S. banks to set
aside reserves against their deposits under section 25 of the
Act, 69 the policy underlying section 19 indicated that the re-
serve requirement was clearly intended to protect domestic
creditors.70 Therefore, "[r]eserve[s] should [not] be carried
against foreign deposits in a place where such reserve[s] could
not perform the functions it is intented to perform.' 7 1
In 1970, the Federal Reserve issued an opinion 72 regard-
ing reports that member banks were "in effect guarantee[ing]
payment of . . .deposits in the United States if the foreign
branch is precluded from making payment. ' 73 The opinion
stated that foreign branch offices were not subject to reserve
requirements so long as the deposits were payable only outside
of the United States. 4
The exemption, the opinion noted, primarily enabled U.S.
foreign branch offices to compete on equal footing with the
local banks. 7'5 The opinion also noted that the foreign deposi-
tor "assumes whatever risk may exist that the foreign country
might impose restrictions on withdrawals.' 7  When the for-
eign deposit is guaranteed, however, the depositor "no longer
assumes such risk, but enjoys substantially the same right[s] [as
a domestic depositor]" as if the foreign deposit had been made
67. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYS-
TEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 13 (1984).
68. Reserves of Foreign Branches, 4 Fed. Res. Bull. 1123 (1918).
69. Ch. 6, § 25, 38 Stat. 251, 273-74 (1913) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 601-604 (1982)).
70. Reserves of Foreign Branches, 4 Fed. Res. Bull. 1123 (1918).
71. Id.
72. Interpretation of Regulations D and Q Deposits in Foreign Branches Guar-
anteed by Domestic Offices of Member Banks, 56 Fed. Res. Bull. 140 (1970) [herein-
after Interpretations of Regulations D and QJ.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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in the United States." Thus, the opinion concluded that to
assure effectiveness of and to prevent evasions from reserve
requirements, such guaranteed foreign deposits are subject to
reserve regulations "the same as if the deposit had been made
in the domestic office." 78 This position was reaffirmed in
1983. T'
Congress codifed the foreign branch reserve exemption
into the Act in 19800 and in 1981 excluded deposits at foreign
branches from coverage by the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration.8' When these exemptions are read with section 19
of the Act, which states that reserves are to be used solely for
the purpose of implementing monetary policy, it can be in-
ferred that Congress believed that deposits in foreign branch
offices were not important to the implementation of U.S. mon-
etary policy.
C. To Guaranty or Not To Guaranty
Since the opinions and rulings of U.S. monetary policy-
makers generally exclude deposits held in foreign branches un-
less such deposits are guaranteed by the U.S. office, 2 it is im-
portant to review the rules governing guarantees of foreign
branch deposits.
A guaranty has been defined by case law as a promise to
answer for the debt or default of another.8 3 It is a contract
between a third party and a party to whom performance is due
on the primary contract. Current Treasury Regulations allow a
member bank to become a guarantor84 if the bank: (i) has a
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Deposits Payable Outside United States-Guarantee by U.S. Bank, I Fed.
Reserve Reg. Serv. 1 2-330.1 (Staff Op. July 29, 1983); Deposits Payable Outside the
United States-CD Issued in United States, I Fed. Reserve Reg. Serv. 2-521.1 (Staff
Op. Mar. 21, 1983).
80. Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, sec. 103, § 19(b)(6), 94
Stat. 132, 136 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 461(b)(6) (1982)).
81. International Banking Facility Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 97-110,
sec. 102, § 3(t)(5), 95 Stat. 1513, 1513 (1981) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 1813(I)(5)(A)
(1982)).
82. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
83. United States v. Frisk, 675 F.2d 1079, 1082 n.6 (9th Cir. 1982).
84. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7010 provides that:
(a) A national bank may lend its credit, bind itself as a suretv to in-
demnify another, or otherwise become a guarantor if it has a substantial
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"substantial interest" in the performance of the transaction in-
volved;15 or (ii) has a segregated deposit sufficient in amount
to cover the bank's total potential liability."
The decision to guaranty the deposit held in the foreign
branch office is a complicated one involving a host of business
decisions. The home office must decide whether it is willing to
make its asset base available to settle the guaranty. It must
also decide whether it will be required to establish a fund equal
to the amount of the guaranteed deposit. Such a fund may be
required since payment to the depositor of a foreign branch
might not be labeled a "substantial interest" of the home of-
fice.87
If repayment of the deposit is viewed as a "substantial in-
terest" a separate fund will not be required.88 But, since the
deposit is no longer payable only outside the United States it
would be considered a domestic deposit leading to the imposi-
tion of the reserve requirement.8 9 This requirement, however,
would reduce the pool of funds available to the foreign branch
and place it at a competitive disadvantage with local banks.
III. THE CONFLICTING TREATMENT ACCORDED TO
FOREIGN DEPOSITS
The key distinction between the conflicting views of
United States courts and U.S. monetary policymakers lies in
the way each side views the relationship among the key parties:
interest in the performance of the transaction involved or has a segregated
deposit sufficient in amount to cover the bank's total liability. For example,
a bank, as a fiduciary, has a sufficient interest in the faithful performance by
its cofiduciary of his duties to act as surety on the bond of such cofiduciary.
(b) Under appropriate circumstances, foreign branches may exercise
additional powers pursuant to [the Act].
12 C.F.R. § 7.7010 (1988). 12 C.F.R. § 7.7012 provides that: "A national bank may
guarantee the deposits and other liabilities of its Edge Act and agreement corpora-
tions and its corporate instrumentalities in foreign countries." Id. § 7.7012 (1988).
85. Id. § 7.7010(a) (1988).
86. Id.
87. Since 12 C.F.R. § 7.7012 specifically allows a national bank to guaranty the
deposits in its foreign branches, it could be viewed that such a move is not within 12
C.F.R. § 7.7010(a), see supra note 84 for text (substantial interest provision thus re-
quiring a special fund equal to the guaranty). See sipr note 84.
88. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7010(a), provides for either the presence of a substantial inter-
est or the use of a special fund equal to the amount of the guaranty, hut not both. See
sipra note 84.
89. Interpretations of Regulations 1) and Q, spra note 72.
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the U.S. bank home office, the foreign branch, and the foreign
depositor.
A. Relationship Among the Parties
U.S. case law holding the home office liable for the return
of confiscated or frozen deposits places the home office as the
debtor to the foreign depositor and makes the foreign branch a
mere teller's window.90 These decisions make the home office
the guarantor to the foreign depositor, since the home office is
called upon to answer for the debt of another person. In con-
trast, the position consistent with U.S. monetary policy is that
the home office is a third party to the deposit contract between
the foreign depositor and foreign branch office.
Support for this latter view can be found in the 1970 Fed-
eral Reserve opinion.9' In that opinion the Federal Reserve
specifically disapproved of the guaranteeing of deposits in for-
eign branch offices. It stated that it was important for U.S.
monetary policy that the foreign depositor, and not the home
office, assume the risk of non-payment. 92 This position was re-
affirmed in two 1983 Federal Reserve staff opinions," as well
as in the amicus curiae brief filed by the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York in Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A."
Further support is contained in Congressional actions re-
garding the implementation of U.S monetary policy. In 1980,
Congress amended the Act with the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 19 8 0 ")5 (the "Mone-
tary Control Act"). The Monetary Control Act addressed new
deposit instruments used by U.S. banks that were not covered
by the reserve requirement provisions of the Act."" The banks
90. The phrase "teller's window" in the context of U.S. bank home office liabil-
itv was coined by Referee Harrison Tweed in Dougherty v. National City Bank of
New York. 157 Misc. 849, 285 N.Y.S. 491 (Sup. Ct. 1935), where he noted, "The
branches were not, of course, corporate entities separate and distinct from the [home
officel, but they were something more than . . . 'teller's windows.' " Id. at 858, 285
N.Y.S. at 502.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
94. See N.Y. Fed. Brief in WFAL, supra note 53, at 7-9.
95. Pub. 1. No. 96-22 1, sees. 101-108, 94 Slat. 132, 132-41 (codified at scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
96. S. REL'. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE
CoNc. & AnMIN. N :ws 236. 249-51.
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were incurring debt for which the system had no safeguard.
The Monetary Control Act authorized the Federal Reserve to
impose the reserve requirement on these new deposit instru-
ments .7
The Senate Report on the Monetary Control Act noted
that reserves were required to allow the Federal Reserve to
pursue "[s]ound management of [U.S.] monetary policy" in
the wake of the use of these new deposit instruments.9" Con-
gress characterized the inclusion of these deposits as impor-
tant to the Federal Reserve's management of U.S. monetary
policy. 9 But Congress did not mention that deposits in for-
eign branches should be included. In fact, Congress specifi-
cally incorporated the exemption that the Federal Reserve had
recognized for so long.' 00 If Congress believed that foreign
deposits were important to the implementation of U.S. mone-
tary policy, it would have listed foreign deposits with the other
deposit instruments. Instead, Congress reaffirmed the long-
standing regulatory treatment of foreign branch deposits by
specifically excluding foreign deposits from consideration.'0 1
B. The Current Problem
By treating U.S. bank home offices as guarantors of for-
eign branch deposits, U.S. courts have now exposed U.S. bank
home offices to an unreserved liability-the very risk that U.S.
monetary policymakers have specifically tried to protect them
from.
Arguably, holding U.S. bank home offices liable for the
deposits held in their foreign branches would do little harm to
their asset base, their stockholders, or their ability to make
money in the future. And, as the Vishipco court noted, "fair-
ness" dictates that U.S. bank home offices should pay when
their foreign branch office can not."1' 2 But such a practice ig-
nores the impact that liability has on U.S. monetary policy.
97. Id. at 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 249.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 14-15, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADEIlN. NEws at 249-51.
100. See Monetary Control Act of 1980, sec. 103, § 19(b)(6), 94 Stat. 132, 136
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(6) (1982)).
101. See id.
102. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 660 F.2d 854, 864 (2d Cir. 1981),
rert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
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As of December 31, 1986, nine of the largest U.S. banks
collectively held US$208 billion in domestic deposits and
US$184 billion in foreign deposits. t'0 3 Under current federal
law and regulations, these banks must set aside reserves on the
US$208 billion in domestic deposits.' °4 This figure is also
used by the Federal Reserve in making decisions to regulate
the growth of the money supply.'0° If any one of these banks
failed, regulators would be called in to figure out a way of re-
turning this debt to the depositors. 0 6
Unless the U.S. bank home office guarantees that a foreign
deposit can be collected at the U.S. bank home office, the
US$184 billion in foreign deposits are not accorded similar
treatment. 0 7 This situation is exactly what the Federal Re-
serve10 8 and Congress 0 9 found desirable for the implementa-
tion of U.S. monetary policy. But the court decisions holding
the U.S. bank home office liable have the effect of adding
US$184 billion in debt to these home offices. This is debt that
neither the Federal Reserve nor Congress took into account
when establishing the guidelines for regulating U.S. monetary
policy.
Foreign depositors now enjoy the security of a U.S. do-
mestic deposit with a higher interest rate,"o while the U.S.
103.
Domestic Deposits Foreign Deposits
(in millions of US$) (in millions of US$)
Bank of America 56,674 21,324
Bankers Trust Company 12,398 21,487
Chemical Bank 26,726 12,347
Citibank 39,956 59,952
Continental Illinois 8,987 9,691
First Nat'l Bank 11,674 13,235
of Chicago
Manufacturers Hanover 24,521 20,680
Morgan Guaranty 15,297 29,484
Security Pacific 27,918 6,656
See RAND McN,%.tx BANKERS DIRECTORY 780, 2866, 2888, 2892, 1310, 1316, 2914,
2926, 712 (1987).
104. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
106. For a discussion of the rescue of the Franklin National Bank, see W. MEl.-
TON. slwia note 61, at 158-60.
107. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
108. See id.
109. See su/na notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
110. The district Court's summary judgment opinion in lWells l'aigo noted:
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monetary system is now liable for debt that it is not designed
to handle. The courts have made the U.S. monetary system
the guarantor of every foreign depositor of a U.S. bank without
creating a corresponding safeguard to ensure a stable money
supply.
C. Resolution
The resolution of this problem must proceed on the fol-
lowing three premises. First, the foreign depositor assumes
the risk that its country may restrict the disposition of its de-
posit.' Second, the operation of a foreign branch office does
not assure the foreign depositor that it can go to any office of
the bank and demand the return of its deposit." 12 The foreign
[WFAL] makes a cogent argument that the theory propounded by Ci-
tibank to explain the higher rate of interest borne by a Eurodollar deposit-
that the depositer [sic] assumes a sovereign risk-is considerably undercut
by the fact that the higher rate of interest is uniform among countries whose
governments might be regarded as more or less "risky" than others. Thus,
the Manila deposits here at issue bore the same rate of interest as those
placed in London, Frankfurt and Singapore on the same day. Suggestive as
the circumstance might be, we believe whether the validity of Citibank's po-
sition is thereby undermined is a question for the trier of fact.
Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 612 F. Supp. 351, 356 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
The district court adopted WFAL's view in the subsequent trial. Wells Fargo
Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 660 F. Supp. 946, 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), remanded, No. 87-
7685 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 1988) (order directing limited remand), previous judgment re-
affiimed, No. 84 Civ. 996 (WK), slip op., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3604 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
22, 1988) (supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law).
The district court, however, failed to recognize that the distinction is not be-
tween different offshore markets but between the U.S. market and the offshore mar-
ket as a whole. The New York Federal Reserve Bank noted:
The effect of the exemption [from the reserve requirement] was to pro-
mote competitive equality between offshore offices of United States banks
and their foreign counterparts. In part because foreign branches of United
States depository institutions are not required to hold reserve against de-
posits payable only outside the United States, they are able to pay the higher
rates of interest on deposits found in the offshore banking market. Thus,
they are better able to compete with local banks which generally are not
subject to any reserve requirements.
N.Y. Fed. Brief in WFAI., supra note 53, at 7.
Thus, the key to the higher interest rate as an indicator of additional risk does
not lie in the interest rate offered in different offshore deposit markets, but in the
difference in interest rate offered between the U.S. deposit market and the offshore
deposit market as a whole. The foreign depositor receives a higher interest rate for
the less regulated and less secure offshore market.
I11. See sipra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
112. See snpra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. But see Heininger, supra note
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branch office merely offers the foreign depositor services that a
local branch may not be able to provide. Finally, there is no
contractual relationship between the U.S. bank home office
and the foreign depositor when the deposit contract is made
with the foreign branch office. The only existing contractual
relationship is between the foreign depositor and the foreign
branch office. It is incumbent upon the foreign depositor to
alter this relationship to provide security for its deposit.' '3 It is
the responsibility of the foreign depositor to bring the U.S.
bank home office into its contract with the foreign branch of-
fice. There are three options that could be used to remedy the
current conflict.
1. Guaranty Payment in the United States
The foreign depositor could sign a guaranty agreement
with the U.S. bank home office providing for payment of his
deposit at the U.S. bank home office. This agreement would
provide the foreign depositor with the security it requires.
The foreign branch, however, would be required to set aside
reserves against the deposit." 14 This requirement would cause
a reduction in the pool of funds available to it to make loans
and investments. The foreign branch would be placed at a
competitive disadvantage when compared to the local banks
since the foreign branch might not be able to offer competitive
local interest rates. Also the U.S. bank home office is required
to use its assets as security for the deposit since the foreign
branch office reserves would be confiscated along with its
other assets. Unless the U.S. bank home office is required to
set aside a special fund equal to its liability under the guar-
anty,' '" the U.S. bank home office asset base, and thereby U.S.
monetary policy, will be adversely affected.
42, at 911 n.20 (bank may not be able to operate abroad if liability was limited by
incorporating the foreign office as a subsidiary as opposed to operating it as a
branch).
113. Since the foreign depositor is assuming the risk of non-payment because of
local restrictions, see supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text, it is his responsibility
to shift this risk to another party, namely the home office.
114. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
115. Set, supra note 86-89 and accompanying text.
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2. Teller's Window
The foreign branch office could act as an agent for the
U.S. bank home office. In this situation, the deposit is
"opened" in the U.S. bank home office with the provision that
the foreign depositor can draw on the account at the foreign
branch office.' 1 6 The foreign depositor would accept the lower
interest rate offered by the U.S. bank home office but he would
receive the security he desires. There are, however, two major
problems with this option.
First, by acting as an agent the foreign branch does not
have the use of the funds to make loans or other investments.
Second, this option encourages capital flight, since many de-
positors would no doubt prefer the added security offered to a
deposit located in the United States. Laws could be enacted to
ensure that only a certain amount is available for this treat-
ment, but it is unlikely that any nation would encourage the
exodus of currency upon which the local economy is depen-
dent for economic growth.
3. No Guaranty
Finally, the foreign depositor could be held to the bargain
it struck with the foreign branch office. The foreign depositor
is aware that the return of its deposit is dependent upon the
local laws governing its contract with the foreign branch and
that U.S. law prohibits payment in the United States unless the
deposit is guaranteed by the U.S. home office. The foreign de-
positor accepts the higher interest rate in exchange for this
risk.' Its deposit is in no better or worse position than the
deposit in a locally incorporated bank. It is the foreign deposi-
tor's responsibility to withdraw its deposit if confiscation or
other limitations seem imminent.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. courts' practice of holding the U.S. bank home
office liable for foreign branch office deposits, and the estab-
lishment of rules of disengagement for foreign branch offices
116. See. e.g., Sokoloff v. National City Bank of N.Y., 130 Misc. 66, 224 N.Y.S.
102 (Sup. Ct. 1927), aff d without opinion, 223 A.D. 754, 227 N.Y.S. 907, aff'd, 250
N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928).
117. See siupra note 110 and accompanying text.
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faced with political unrest appear to provide a workable solu-
tion to the problem. But this practice places the U.S. bank
home office as the guarantor of the foreign depositor and adds
debt that the U.S. monetary system is not designed to handle.
The U.S. courts should recognize the clear intention of U.S.
monetary policymakers to isolate foreign deposits from U.S.
monetary policy consideration hold that the risk of non-pay-
ment is upon the foreign depositor and riot the U.S. bank
home office. The U.S. bank home office should be held liable
only when the foreign depositor has taken steps to provide for
payment in the United States and the U.S. bank home office
has taken steps to bring the deposit within the U.S. monetary
system. Fairness dictates that the foreign depositor of a U.S.
bank should not be allowed to gain a more favorable position
than other local depositors simply because his bank has an of-
fice in the United States.
Marvin J. Miller Jr. *
* J.D. candidate, 1990, Fordham University.
